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This paper studies the formation of human capital and its transmission across generations 
when premature adult mortality is a salient feature of the demographic landscape, either 
permanently or in the form of a long-period wave that follows the outbreak of an epidemic. 
We establish several threshold properties of the model, for such a shock can severely retard 
economic growth, even to the point of leading to an economic collapse. Premature adult 
mortality may exacerbate inequality under nuclear family arrangements. Pooling mortality 
risks with equal treatment of all children may fend off, or even induce, a collapse, depending 
on the initial conditions and the size and duration of the shock. Awareness campaigns may 
also trigger a collapse by introducing undesirable expectational feedbacks. 
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The great historical epidemic that springs to the European mind is the Black Death. Sweep-
ing through Europe between 1347 and 1351, the Plague carried off about one-third of the
entire population. It has been argued that this demographic catastrophe undermined the feu-
dal system and freed these societies from the burden of overpopulation. McNeill (1976) and
other historians have argued that great plagues also left a cultural and psychological legacy
of despair and pessimism. This latter thesis is vigorously challenged by Cohn (2003), who
observes that the Plague was soon followed not only by the general optimism and individu-
alism of the Renaissance, but also by the growing conviction, in medical and literate circles
at least, that the Plague’s causes lay not in God’s wrath or the position of the stars, but rather
in this natural world.
The great modern plague is HIV/AIDS; but there are some striking differences between the
two diseases. The Black Death carried off rich and poor, and young and old alike, usually
in a matter of days. AIDS is selective, and its individual course is both lengthy and, until
the end stages, free of symptoms. Its victims are overwhelmingly young adults and those in
early middle-age, the great majority with children to raise and care for. This selectivity is
fundamental; for if parents die while their children are still young, then all the means needed
to raise the children so that they can become productive and capable citizens will be greatly
reduced. The affected families’ lifetime income will shrink, and thus the means to ﬁnance
education. The children will also lose the love, knowledge and guidance which complement
formal education. AIDS does much more, therefore, than destroy the existing abilities and
capacities embodied in its victims; it also weakens the mechanism through which human
capital is formed in the next generation and beyond. These ramiﬁcations will take decades to
make themselves fully felt. Like the course of the disease in individuals, they are long-drawn
out and insidious. All the while, the growing burden on surviving adults can threaten ﬁscal
stability and institutions like the extended family, and the incessant reminders of an untimely
death can seize society with a pessimism that hinders provision for the future.
Motivated by the character of the AIDS epidemic, the purpose of this paper is to develop
2a framework that focuses on the transmission of human capital between generations when
premature adult mortality is a salient feature of the demographic landscape, either perma-
nently or in the form of a long-period wave that follows the initial outbreak of an epidemic.
Such a framework is also applicable to, inter alia, tuberculosis, whose incidence is closely
connected to that of AIDS and which is also responsible for a large part of the so-called
burden of disease in poor countries. The framework’s basic elements are as follows. Parents
have preferences over current consumption and the level of human capital attained by their
children, making due allowance for early mortality when the children reach adulthood. The
decision about how much to invest in education, as the alternative to child labour, is inﬂu-
enced by premature adult mortality in two ways. First, in the present, the family’s lifetime
income depends on the adults’ health status and longevity. Second, the expected pay-off
depends on the level of premature mortality in the future. An increase in such mortality may
result in a progressive collapse of human capital and productivity, depending on how how
sharp it is, how long it is sustained and how expectations are formed.
One important effect of an increase in premature adult mortality is to exacerbate inequality,
if only initially, in nuclear family systems. For if orphaned children are not given the care
and education enjoyed by those with parents, the weakening of the inter-generational trans-
mission mechanism will express itself in increasing inequality among the next generation
of adults and the families they form. An alternative form of social organization is the ex-
tended family, whose surviving adults take in related orphans. Such a pooling arrangement
might protect a society from a collapse. We show that pooling puts the society on a “make
or break” road in the following sense. Pooling can lead to a collapse which might otherwise
be avoidable, especially if the epidemic causes quite severe mortality. In a less lethal dis-
ease environment, in contrast, pooling is a form of social organization that helps fend off a
collapse that would occur under a nuclear family structure.
This paper is related to various strands in the literature. First, there is the general empirical
observation that good health has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on aggregate
output (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Bloom and Canning, 2000; Bloom, Canning and
Sevilla, 2001). The report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (WHO, 2001)
also stresses that widespread diseases are a formidable barrier to economic growth. Second,
3there are studies of the macroeconomic effects of AIDS. Papers that adopt an OLG frame-
work have chosen somewhat different points of emphasis. In our model, higher mortality
risk undermines the formation of human capital through three channels: ﬁrst, if one or both
parents die early, their children will have less productive capacity, as less human capital is
transmitted; second, the loss of income due to early death in a family reduces schooling;
third, the chance that the children themselves will be infected as adults makes investment
in their education less attractive. Corrigan, Glomm and M´ endez (2004, 2005) consider only
the ﬁrst two channels, but they allow for effects on the accumulation of physical capital,
which are absent in our model. Hence, our paper complements theirs in establishing how
AIDS might inﬂuence the course of per capita income. A notable recent paper that adopts
a Solovian structure is Young (2005), which estimates the impact of the AIDS epidemic on
future living standards in South Africa through its effects on schooling and fertility, with a
constant savings rate. Young ﬁnds that the reduction in labor supply heavily outweighs the
damage done to human capital accumulation, so that using per capita living standards as the
yardstick, the epidemic is a boon to the generations which survive and succeed it.
Third, thereisthe recentliteratureon economicgrowthin whichthetransition throughdiffer-
ent regimes is endogenously generated. This was initiated by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000),
who describe, within a uniﬁed framework, long-run development processes from an epoch
of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth in modern times. We fo-
cus, in contrast, on how some epidemics may induce a transition from a state of continuous
growth to a state of backwardness and poverty. Our paper is complementary to the recent
illuminating contribution of Chakraborty (2004), who studies endogenous mortality in an
overlapping generations model. He shows how better health, by improving longevity and
reducing the risks of mortality, is conducive to growth, and points to health investment as a
prerequisite for sustaining growth. Another related paper is Lagerl¨ of (2003), who examines
the long-run development process in Western Europe, with particular attention to epidemic
shocks that affect child mortality. He shows that a series of mild shocks causes a transition
from a Malthusian stage to the Industrial Revolution, since population does not expand so
rapidly as it would otherwise, thereby raising productivity in human capital production and
income growth. In our framework, a negative epidemic shock affects parents when young,
4so interrupting the transmission of human capital across generations, whereas in Lagerl¨ of
(2003), epidemic diseases might actually spur growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The basic model, which builds on Bell and Gersbach
(2001) and Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) by combining epidemiological and eco-
nomic dynamics, is set out in Section 2. The dynamics of the system under both stationary
and non-stationary mortality proﬁles are analyzed in Section 3, paying special attention to
the conditions for an economic collapse to occur. We illustrate plausible time paths by means
of an example in Section 4. In Section 5 we examine pooling as an alternative form of orga-
nization that has both advantages and drawbacks in such a setting. In Section 6 we show that
awareness campaigns may introduce some undesirable tradeoffs when a government wants
to promote the understanding of how an epidemic evolves. A proper understanding of the
causes of the disease may help to reduce the current risk of infection, but it may also induce
an upward revision of expected mortality, which may trigger a collapse. The concluding sec-
tion is devoted to an assessment and applications of the overall results and the most fruitful
directions of future research.
2 The Model
There are two periods of life, childhood and adulthood. On becoming adults, individuals
immediately form families and have children, who, when very young, neither work nor at-
tend school. Since the only form of investment is education, the family’s full income is
wholly consumed in this phase. Only afterwards do the adults learn whether they will die
prematurely, and so leave their children as half- or full orphans. Early in each generation
of adults, therefore, all nuclear families are sorted into one of the following four categories:
both parents survive into old age, the father dies prematurely, the mother dies prematurely,
both parents die prematurely. These states are denoted by st ∈ St := {1,2,3,4}, respec-
tively. The probability that a family formed at the start of period t lands in category st is
denoted by πt(st). The population is large enough that this is also the fraction of all fami-
lies in that state after all premature adult deaths have occurred. An important consequence
5of such mortality is that it results in heterogeneity among each cohort of families. Once its
state has been revealed, a family makes its decisions accordingly, where the surviving adults’





t denote, respectively, the father’s and mother’s endowments of human capital,
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t, Λt(4) = 0. (1)
How the partners are matched can affect heterogeneity in the population in future periods,
and hence the behavior of the whole system. Some sort of assortative mating is a major
feature of most epidemiological models (e.g., Mulder and Johnson, 2005). The following
‘rule’ simpliﬁes the analysis:




Under Assumption 1, eq. (1) specializes to
Λt(1) = 2λt, Λt(2) = Λt(3) = λt, Λt(4) = 0,
where the superscripts f and m may be dropped without introducing ambiguity.
Human capital is assumed to be formed by a process of child-rearing combined with formal
education in the following way. In the course of rearing their children, parents give them a
certain capacity to build human capital for adulthood, a capacity which is itself increasing
in the parents’ own human capital. This gift will be of little use, however, unless it is com-
plemented by at least some formal education. Let the proportion of childhood devoted to
education be denoted by et ∈ [0,1], the residual being allocated to work, and for simplicity,
let all the children in a family be treated in the same way. Expressed formally, the human
capital attained by each of the children on reaching adulthood is assumed to be given by
λt+1 =
½
z(st)f(et)Λt(st) + 1, st = 1,2,3
ξ (≤ 1) st = 4 (2)
The term z(st) represents the strength with which capacity is transmitted across generations.
It is plausible that the father’s and mother’s contributions to this process are not perfect
6substitutes, in which case, 2z(1) > max[z(2),z(3)], and z(2) may not be equal to z(3). For
simplicity, however, we restrict the possibilities as follows:
Assumption 2. z(2) = z(3) ≥ z(1) ≥ z(2)/2 = z(3)/2 > 0.
If the parents are perfect complements, then z(1) = z(2) = z(3); if perfect substitutes, then
2z(1) = z(2) = z(3). Assumptions 1 and 2 allow the upper branch of (2) to be rewritten as
λt+1 = (3 − st)z(st)f(et)λt + 1, st = 1,2 (3)
Since both types of single-parent families (st = 2,3) are identical in this respect, we may
omit st = 3.
The function f(·) may be thought of as representing the educational technology. The only
restrictions we impose on it are summarized in:
Assumption 3. f(·) is a continuous, strictly increasing and differentiable function on [0, 1],
with f(0) = 0.
Observe that Assumption 3 implies that children who do not attend school at all attain, as
adults, only some basic level of human capital, which has been normalized to unity. A whole
society of such adults will be said to be in a state of economic backwardness.
We now turn to the lower branch of (2). According to this branch, there is a miserable
outcome for full orphans who do not enjoy the good fortune of being adopted or placed in
(good) institutional care. Deprived of love and care, and left to their own devices, they go
through childhood uneducated, to attain human capital ξ in adulthood. For convenience,
we set ξ = 1. Diseases that increase orphanhood, combined with the technical condition
f(0) = 0, therefore constitute a potentially powerful threat to long-term economic growth.
Output takes the form of an aggregate consumption good. The following assumption implies
that current output will accrue to families as income in proportion to the amounts of labor,
measured in efﬁciency units, that they supply.
7Assumption 4. Output is proportional to inputs of labor measured in efﬁciency units.
A natural normalization is that an adult who possesses human capital in the amount λt is
endowed with λt efﬁciency units of labor, which he or she supplies completely inelastically.
Let a child supply (1 − et)γ efﬁciency units of labor when the child works 1 − et units of
time, where γ ∈ (0,1), i.e., a full-time working child is less productive than an uneducated
adult. A family with nt children therefore has a total income in state st of
yt(st) = α[Λt(st) + nt(1 − et)γ ], st = 1,2,3 (4)
where the scalar α (> 0) denotes the productivity of human capital, measured in units of
output per efﬁciency unit of labor input.
2.1 Disease and the Epidemiological Environment
The biology of HIV and AIDS is well known. HIV spreads through sexual intercourse or
contact with infected blood, be it through unsterilized needles, other medical instruments or
transfusion. Epidemiological and demographic modelling has proven to be difﬁcult because
behaviour is heterogeneous across subpopulations. However, a series of models of the spread
of HIV have been formulated and successfully applied to particular countries (see, e.g., Ma-
gruder, 2005, and Mulder and Johnson, 2005, for surveys and discussion). Such models
typically break down the population into groups with respect to gender, family status, sexual
activity and class, predict infectivity at the micro level and then derive the consequences at
the aggregate level.
We incorporate two key characteristics of such models into our macroeconomic model. First,
the current risk of infection is an increasing function of the number of people infected in the
past. Second, prevalence rates depend on the time that has passed since the outbreak of the
disease.1 In what follows, we shall need an aggregate statistic of premature adult mortality.
The proportion of all young adults at the start of period t who will live to see old age is
1Random shocks to the level of mortality can also be incorporated.
8(2πt(1) + πt(2) + πt(3))/2. We therefore deﬁne the adult survival rate as
κt ≡ [1 + πt(1) − πt(4)]/2 ≤ 1, (5)
where κt = 1 if there is no premature mortality at all (πt(1) = 1), and κt < 1 otherwise; so
that 1 − κt is the level of premature adult mortality in period t. Epidemiological modelling
then implies the following aggregate relationship:
κt+1 = g(κt,t), (6)
where the epidemic starts at t = 0 in an environment with some pre-existing level of mor-
tality 1 − κ−1 ≤ 1 and g is a function [0,1] × IN → [0,1]. The known patterns of how the




< κt ∀t ∈ [0,T)
≥ κ ≡ g(κT,T) ∀t ≥ T (7)
The pandemic reaches peak mortality in period T. Thereafter, it may wane a little or decline
substantially.
2.2 The Household’s Behavior
It is assumed that all allocative decisions lie in the parents’ hands, as long as they are alive.
We rule out any bequests at death, so that the whole of current income, as given by (4), is
consumed. Where the allocation of consumption within the family is concerned, let the hus-
band and wife enjoy equality as partners, and let each child obtain a fraction β ∈ (0,1) of an
adult’s consumption if at least one adult survives. Full orphans (st = 4) do not attend school
and consume what they produce as child laborers – unless adequate social arrangements are
in place to care for them.
Consider a union of partners with human capital λt. The household’s budget constraint is
[(3 − st) + ntβ]ct + αntγet ≤ α[(3 − st)λt + ntγ], st = 1,2 (8)
9where ct is the level of each adult’s consumption. The LHS is the sum of consumption and
the opportunity costs of the children’s schooling. The expression on the RHS is the family’s
so-called full income.2 Observe that single-parent households not only have lower levels
of full income than their otherwise identical two-parent counterparts, but also face a higher
relative price of education, deﬁned as αntγ/[(3 − st) + ntβ].
Let all mortality among children occur in infancy, and suppose that so-called ‘replacement
fertility’ behavior is unhindered by premature adult mortality.
Assumption 5. Couples have children while they are young until some exogenously ﬁxed
number have survived infancy, a target that may vary from period to period.
The assumption that net fertility is unaffected by changes in mortality due to disease re-
quires justiﬁcation. Theory suggests that high mortality among adults may lead to a high
precautionary demand for children at the expense of their education. Using data on a panel
of countries, both Lorentzen et al. (2005) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) ﬁnd that adult mor-
tality and gross fertility (the total fertility rate) are indeed positively related – in contrast
to Young’s (2005) ﬁnding for South Africa. Here it should be remarked that AIDS is also
causing a heavy toll of child mortality through transmission at birth, so that a rise in gross
fertility, should it occur, will not be matched by a corresponding rise in net fertility. Most
epidemiological models suggest that as mortality rates increase, fertility rates tend to fall,
though the decline is modest (see, e.g., Mulder and Johnson [2005]). On balance, Assump-
tion 5 seems to be a justiﬁable simpliﬁcation. In our framework, moreover, lower fertility
introduces opposing effects on the optimal level of education, as both the weight on future
utility from investment in education and the sacriﬁce of current consumption become smaller
when net fertility declines.3 In the present setting, therefore, the assumption that net fertil-
ity is given in each generation errs, if at all, on the side of caution. Finally, our qualitative
results concerning the threat of an economic collapse remain valid even if education were to
increase when fertility declines.4
2A household’s full income is the scalar product of its endowment vector and the vector of market prices.
Here, output is taken as the num´ eraire.
3In the numerical example in Section 4, education actually declines slightly when fertility declines.
4Bruhns (2005) formulates a closely related theoretical model in which households choose net fertility, and
10With nt thus ﬁxed, the adults wait until the state of the family becomes known, and the
survivor(s) then choose some feasible pair (ct,et) subject to (8). They are assumed to have
preferences over their own current consumption and the human capital attained by their chil-
dren in adulthood, taking into account the fact that an investment in a child’s education will
be wholly wasted if that child dies prematurely in adulthood. Let mothers and fathers have
identical preferences, and for two-parent households, let there be no ‘joint’ aspect to the
consumption of the bundle (ct,et): each surviving adult derives (expected) utility from the
bundle so chosen, and these utilities are then added up within the family. In effect, whereas
ct is a private good, the human capital of the children in adulthood is a public good within the
marriage. Since all the children attain λt+1, the only form of uncertainty is that surrounding
the number who will not die prematurely as adults, which is denoted by the random variable
at+1. Let preferences be separable, with representation
EUt(st) = (3 − st)[u(ct) + (Etat+1) · v(λt+1)], st = 1,2 (9)
where the contribution v(λt+1) counts only when death does not come early, E is the expec-
tation operator and Etat+1 is the expected number of children surviving into old age, where
the expectation is formed at time t. The sub-utility functions u(·) and v(·) are assumed to
be increasing, continuous and twice-differentiable. Denoting by κe
t+1 the parents’ subjective
probability that a child born in period t who grows to adulthood will survive to old age, and
recalling Assumption 1 and that all children are treated identically, we obtain
(Etat+1) · v(λt+1) = ntκ
e
t+1v(λt+1),
where λt+1 is given by (3). A reduction in κe
t+1 therefore effectively entails a weaker taste
for the children’s education. It will be convenient in what follows to rewrite (9) as
EUt(st) = (3 − st)[u(ct) + ntκ
e
t+1 · v(z(st)f(et)Λt(st) + 1)], st = 1,2 (10)
since both types of single-parent families are identical. Hence, it sufﬁces to examine the
states st = 1,2. A family in state st (= 1,2) in period t solves the following problem:
max
(ct, et)
EUt(st) s.t. (8), ct ≥ 0, et ∈ [0,1]. (11)
applies it to Kenya. She ﬁnds that endogenous changes in fertility have only minor effects on growth in the





t+1)] solve problem (11), whose parameters are
(α, β, γ, nt). Since current consumption is maximized by choosing et = 0, it follows that
the parents’ altruism towards their children must be sufﬁciently strong if they are to choose
et > 0.
Assumption 6. Both goods are non-inferior.5











Inspection of (10) reveals that an increase in κe







t+1) = 1; foritincreasestheweight
on v(λt+1) relative to that on u(ct). An increase in κe




The remaining comparative static results concern the effect of family status in the present
on investment in, and the accumulation of, human capital. Note that, independently of As-
sumption 1, the upper boundaries of the budget sets in the cases st = 2 and st = 3 lie strictly
inside that associated with st = 1 and that the price of ct relative to et is lower for st = 2,3







and λt+1(1) ≥ λt+1(2) = λt+1(3).
We now introduce the important assumption that altruism is not operative when the adults
are uneducated, i.e., the adults are so poor that they use all their resources for consumption.
Assumption 7. e0
t(Λt(1),1,κe
t+1) = 0 ∀κe
t+1 ∈ [κ,1] and ∀Λt(1) ≤ 2+∆ for some ∆ > 0.




t+1) = 0 ∀κe
t+1 ∈ [κ,1] and
∀Λt(2) = Λt(3) ≤ 1 + ∆/2. Assumption 7 is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient condition for
theexistenceofapovertytrap. ItcanbeshownthatunderAssumption7andintheabsenceof
premature adult mortality, the system has at least two stationary states if z(1)f(1)2λa +1 ≥
5Note that Λt enters into both the budget constraint and the utility that adults derive from λt+1. The
deﬁnition of inferior goods in this particular set-up is not, therefore, the same as the textbook version.
12λa, where λa is the lowest level of an adult’s human capital such that a two-parent household
chooses full education for the children in such an environment (Bell and Gersbach, 2001).
2.3 Dynamics
The structure built up thus far is a random dynamical system, which can be compactly de-
scribed as follows. Recalling that e0
t(Λt(st),st,κe
t+1) is chosen so as to solve problem (11),









Λt(st) + 1, st = 1,2
1 st = 4 (12)
This component is random in the sense that although each child attains λt+1 in adulthood
with certainty, he or she can wind up in any of the states st+1 ∈ {1,2,3,4} after reach-
ing adulthood and forming a family. The other components of the system are eq. (6) and
individuals’ formation of expectations about future mortality, that is, how they arrive at κe
t+1.
Inspection of (12) in the light of Assumption 1 reveals that given the household’s preferences
and the production and education technologies, the level of human capital attained by an
individual who reaches adulthood in period t + 1 depends only on two ‘histories’ and the
level of human capital of the individual’s ancestral forebears in period 0, λ0. The histories
in question are: (i) the particular sequence of family states running from period 0 to period
t, which is denoted by σt ∈ S0 × S1 × ... × St ≡ St; and (ii) the sequence of (subjective)

















The distribution of individual human capital levels in period t + 1 depends on the actual
history of mortality up to the start of that period, namely, {κk}t
k=0.
133 Premature Mortality, Inequality and Economic Collapse
How a full-blown epidemic affects the system as a whole depends, in general, on the initial
conditions. Premature adult mortality is a fact of life, epidemic or no epidemic, and however
small its level may be, it will create full orphans and bereaved spouses. In the absence of
suitable social and insurance arrangements to support them, inequality will surely follow.
In order to make the analysis tractable, we make the following assumptions, which ensure
that the system is initially homogeneous in certain key respects. First, parents are perfect
substitutes: 2z(1) = z(2) = z(3). Second, levels of human capital and productivity before
the outbreak are such that all children, including full orphans, enjoyed full-time education.6
It follows that at the time of the outbreak (t = 0), all adults have the same level of human
capital, and the entire economy is on a path with the asymptotic growth rate 2z(1)f(1) − 1,
which is assumed to be positive.
The outbreak affects the system’s subsequent development in two ways. First, children who
are left as unsupported orphans (s0 = 4) will fall at once into the poverty trap. Assumption 7






= 0 ∀t and ∀κe
t+1 ∈ [κ,1]: even if both parents survive but
have experienced such a childhood, they cannot afford to send their children to school. In
the absence of support, therefore, all orphans fall into the poverty trap, and their succeeding
lineage will remain there. If π0(4) is large enough to cause a breakdown in the existing
arrangements for caring for full orphans, the consequences will be very damaging.
Second, even when at least one parent survives, the sudden increase in premature adult
mortality may reduce the expected returns to investment in education so sharply as to re-
duce e0
0(Λ0(s0),s0,κe
1) (s0 = 1,2,3), depending on how such expectations are formed
and the level of λ0. This effect will normally be strengthened by the attendant increase








1). The next step, therefore, is to establish how large the
6How full orphans are cared for is not speciﬁed in this section. Their numbers are assumed to be sufﬁciently
small that the burden of caring for them up to the outbreak was a light one.
14shock to mortality must be in order that these children and their offspring slide into the
poverty trap.
3.1 Stationary States
We introduce the critical value function λ∗(s,κ) for s ∈ {1,2}, which is deﬁned for sta-
tionary fertility, nt = nt+1 = n ∀t, and stationary mortality, κt = κt+1 = κ ∀t. In this
stationary setting, it is natural to assume perfect foresight: κe
t+1 = κt+1 = κ ∀t ≥ 0. The









∗(s) + 1, (14)
where Λ∗(1) = 2λ∗(1), Λ∗(2) = Λ∗(3) = λ∗(2) = λ∗(3). λ∗(s,κ) is the critical level of
human capital associated with a particular family state s, that is, in any pair of generations,
parent(s) and offspring share the same state and the same, stationary level of human capital.
ItisclearfromAssumption7thatλ∗(s,κ) = 1solves(14). Theassumptionthat2z(1)f(1) ≥
1 also ensures, however, that there is also at least one solution that exceeds unity if κ is not
too small.7 Let λ∗(s,κ) denote the smallest of the values that exceed unity.
Lemma 1
(i) ∂λ∗(s,κ)/∂κ < 0, s = 1,2
(ii) λ∗(1,κ) ≤ λ∗(2,κ) = λ∗(3,κ)
Proof: see appendix. Part (i) states that an increase in premature adult mortality may cause
a group that was earlier enjoying self-sustained growth to fall into the poverty trap. Part
(ii) states that single-parent families need individual levels of human capital that are at least
as large as those needed by two-parent ones in order to escape the trap. It follows that an
increase in premature adult mortality may also increase the share of all families falling into
the trap by increasing the proportion of one-parent families.
7This claim follows by continuity from the associated proposition in Bell and Gersbach (2001), in which
there is no premature adult mortality.
15Lemma 1 enables us to say something deﬁnite about the evolution of human capital. If a
family is in state s, we have the following relationship between the adults’ human capital
and that attained by their children in adulthood when the shock at t represented by κt−1 − κ
is permanent, that is, when the survival rate is constant at κ from t onwards:
λt+1
≥




Hence, if human capital does start to decrease under these conditions, it will eventually reach
λ = 1,8 which is a stable stationary state.
3.2 Dynamics
The critical value function plays an essential role in the analysis of the long-term behaviour
of the system. Only under a very restrictive assumption, however, does it sufﬁce to establish
whether a particular group or a whole society will slide into the poverty trap, namely, that
the shock to mortality is permanent. In fact, epidemics tend to burn themselves out, and after
enough time has elapsed, general mortality tends to revert to some ‘normal’ level. Given
the nature of HIV/AIDS and our choice of an OLG framework, in which each period is a
generation, it seems defensible to describe the course of a full-blown epidemic as follows.
Assumption 8. The outbreak occurs at the start of period 0 and runs its course through to the
end of period 1, with κ−1 > max(κ0,κ1). From period 2 onwards, κ−1 rules once more.
Where expectations are concerned, we assume that the outbreak is a surprise, but that there
is perfect foresight thereafter.
Assumption 9. The outbreak is not anticipated before period 0, but immediately after the
outbreak, all agents foresee the sequence {κt}∞
t=0 perfectly.
Observe that the size of the initial shock to mortality, κ−1 − κ0, affects the proportions of
8Strictly speaking, this statement holds when the system starts with st = 1, or if st = 2,3 and the system
remains in those states for some time.
16families falling into the various states (s0 = 1,2,3,4), but not their choices of e0 given their
state. These choices are, however, inﬂuenced by the survival rate in period 1, which, by
assumption, is foreseen perfectly.
We do not specify for the moment how the arrangements for supporting full orphans are
ﬁnanced; but we do assume that the most vulnerable group in each period, namely, one-
parent families with the lowest levels of human capital, is not burdened thereby and that no
other group is so burdened that its offspring do worse than those whose parents make up the
most vulnerable. This assumption will be innocuous if κ−1 is close to one and the shock is
not too large.9
In view of Lemma 1, it sufﬁces to follow the fortunes of children who are raised in single-
parent families in period 0, and then those of their children who are raised in the same
circumstances in period 1 and attain adulthood in period 2. By virtue of Assumptions 1
and 2, one need examine only the sequence σ1 = (2,2). Noting that it is only the level of
mortality in the next period that affects the choice of et, we have the following sub-sequence















λ1(2) + 1. (16)
Thus, λ2(2,2) ≡ λ2((2,2),κ−1,κ1,λ0) is independent of κ0. Since these adults have the
lowest levels of human capital in period 2, it follows at once that no intervention beyond
ensuring the care of all orphans is needed in order to prevent any group sliding into the trap
if the following condition holds:
λ2((2,2),κ−1,κ1,λ0) > Λ
∗(2,κ−1). (17)
Remark 1. The size of the shock to mortality in period 0, κ−1−κ0, affects the proportions of
(nuclear) families falling into the various states (s0 = 1,2,3,4), but not their choices of e0
given their state. Hence, under the above assumptions about the unspeciﬁed mechanism for
ﬁnancing the care of full orphans, it is only the size of the shock in the second period relative
9We postpone a rigorous treatment of the general case to some later date.
17to the status quo ante, κ−1 − κ1, that matters in determining whether a collapse will ensue.
Remark 2. In view of κ−1 > max(κ0,κ1) (recall Assumption 8), it follows at once that
condition (17) cannot hold if λ0 = Λ∗(2,κ−1) and e0
0((Λ∗(2,κ−1),2,κ−1) < 1. A margin of
safety over Λ∗(2,κ−1) must exist at the outset.
We now examine what happens when the arrangements for raising orphans break down at
once and condition (17) does not necessarily hold. Denote by Pt the fraction of the popu-
lation of adults whose human capital is at most unity in period t, and by Rt the fraction of
individuals that possess at least λ∗(2,κ−1). Note that Pt + Rt ≤ 1. Recalling (15) and (16),
we obtain the following results for the short run:
Lemma 2
Suppose that orphans are uncared for. Then the proportions P1 and R1 satisfy the following:
(i) if λ1(2,κ1,λ0) ≥ λ∗(2,κ−1), then P1 = π0(4), R1 = 1 − π0(4);
(ii) if λ1(1,κ1,λ0) > λ∗(2,κ−1) > λ1(2,κ1,λ0), then P1 ≥ π0(4), R1 = π0(1);
(iii) if λ∗(1,κ−1) > λ1(1,κ1,λ0), then P1 ≥ π0(4), R1 = 0.
The three claims follow immediately from the preceding discussion. In case (i), families with
at least one surviving adult will stay out of the trap, at least temporarily, although one-parent
households will henceforth experience growth at a lower rate if e0
0(2) < 1. The resulting
inequality among families with adults will be propagated into the future, with further differ-
entiation arising from future differences in e0
t(·) among them. In case (ii), only families with
two adults will avoid the trap. Thereafter, the pattern of progressive differentiation described
in case (i) will also take hold here. In case (iii), all families begin to descend into the trap
immediately.
We proceed to period 2. If condition (17) is violated, then R2 ≤ π0(1)·π1(1), with equality if
and only if λ2((1,1),κ−1,κ1,λ0) ≥ λ∗(1,κ−1). On the further assumption that the sequence
{κ0,κ1,κt = κ−1 ∀t ≥ 2} generates an intolerable burden for two-parent familes to keep the
18needyoutof thetrap, andso resultsin abreakdownofthe earlierarrangements forsupporting
them, the preceding discussion yields straightforward implications for the system’s long-run
dynamics.
Proposition 1
If condition (17) is violated and κt < 1 for all t ≥ 0, then:
(i) Pt ≥ Pt−1 + (1 − κt−1)2(1 − Pt−1), t ≥ 1
(ii) limt→∞ Pt = 1
The share of uneducated families grows over time until, in the limit, the whole population
is in backwardness. Not only do some adults suffer sickness and early death, but the whole
society descends progressively into the poverty trap. This dramatic implication leads one to
ask what social arrangements can be made to deal with this danger. One answer is to pool
the risks, a possibility which we take up in Section 5.
3.3 Inequality
The preceding argument establishes that the outbreak of an epidemic of the AIDS kind at ﬁrst
generates inequality if the society is initially homogeneous and the arrangements for support-
ing the needy break down as a result of the shock. A long-drawn out epidemic that maintains
substantial levels of premature adult mortality will, however, eventually do away with in-
equality; for in the limit, all members of the society will ﬁnd themselves in the poverty trap.
The simple point here is that concerns about inequality in the face of such an epidemic must
be formulated with caution. Permanent poverty for all is hardly attractive when sustainable
growth for all – albeit marred by temporary inequality – is a feasible alternative.
194 An Example
Thissection providesa detailed analysis ofan examplewhen Assumptions1, 4, 5, 8 and9 are
assumed to hold in order to illustrate the most important results from the household model
and how the steady state associated with a particular household state st = (1,2) depends on
preferences, premature mortality, and the production and educational technologies.
4.1 The Household’s Decisions




ct if ct ≥ cmin
−∞ otherwise
v(λt+1) = δ ln(λt+1 + ζ), with 0 < δ < 1 and ζ > −1
To simplify the analysis, we maintain the assumption that z(1) = z(2)/2 ≡ ¯ z. Note that this
assumption and the functional forms imply that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. We summarize




t(Λt(2),2,κt+1) ∀ λt and ∀ κt+1 ∈ [κ,1].
(ii) e0(st) := limλt→∞ e0
t(Λt(st),st,κt+1) = min





where limt→∞ κt+1 = κ and nt = n ∀t.















20Proof: see the appendix, in which the closed-form solutions for c0
t(Λt(st),st,κt+1) and
e0
t(Λt(st),st,κt+1) are derived. As long as λt > ˆ λ, the example fulﬁlls all the conditions
of the general household model, as set out in Section 2.2.
4.2 Critical values of λ





(3 − st + nβ)2κδ z · λ∗ − αγ(1 + ζ)
2αγ z · λ∗ · 2λ
∗ + 1, st = 1,2
Solving for λ∗(·) yields:
Corollary 1
Suppose ζ > 0 and αγζ > (3 − st + nβ)2δκz − αγ > 0. Then for st = 1,2, there exists a




(3 − st + nβ)2δκz − αγ
.
Note that ∂λ∗/∂κ < 0: lower premature mortality among adults results in a lower value
of λ∗. Thus, the critical stationary state has the following properties, which accord with
intuition:
Corollary 2





(ii) λ∗(2,κ) > λ∗(1,κ);





The prevailing form of social organization has a potentially important inﬂuence on how the
economic system copes with premature adult mortality. We distinguish between two ideal,
extreme types. First, there is the nuclear family, which is the basis of the preceding set-up.
Parents are solely responsible for their own children, so that the children’s fortunes depend
entirely on their natural parents’ health status and human capital (or income).
The second type involves collective arrangements, under which a subset of society, be it
the inhabitants of a region or city, the members of a tribe, or even a very large extended
family, pools its resources. It is widely observed that in Africa, orphans are often taken
in by, and rotated among, relatives. To examine this arrangement, we allow the society to
be pooled completely, that is, all surviving adults in the society take on joint responsibility
for all children in their group. For simplicity, we assume that within each generation, all
adults and children are treated identically – although this probably goes a bit too far: Case,
Paxson and Ableidinger (2002), for example, show that the schooling of orphans heavily
depends on how closely they are related to the adoptive household head. In any event, full
poolingsufﬁcestodiversifycompletelythe idiosyncraticmortalityrisk, andthe pooledgroup
faces only the aggregate risk, as summarized by κ.10 Pooling introduces the need for some
additional notation: it will be denoted by the family state st = 0. All the formal assumptions
in preceding sections are maintained here.
5.1 The Household’s Behavior under Pooling
By Assumption 5, each couple produces nt surviving children in period t; but not all of the
adults themselves survive to rear their offspring. Under complete pooling, the children are
10We could also consider partial pooling as an intermediate case where a sufﬁciently large subset of the
society – subintervals in the model – is pooled. Partial pooling on such a scale already sufﬁces to achieve
complete insurance against idiosyncratic risks.





children. In effect, the burden of premature adult mortality is borne equally by all surviving
members of a generation. The budget constraint of a representative ‘pair’ is
[2 + (nt/κt)β]ct + α(nt/κt)γ · et ≤ α[2λt + (nt/κt)γ], (19)
a comparison of which with (8) reveals that, relative to an otherwise identical two-parent
nuclear family, the presence of premature adult mortality implies a lower relative price of
current consumption and a lower level of full income, measured in units of an adult’s con-
sumption, so long as β > γ. On this score, therefore, a rise in such mortality works to reduce
education, relative to the two-parent, nuclear family. It is also seen that by setting κt equal
to 1 and 1/2, respectively, (19) specializes to the cases st = 1 and st = 2 in (8). As will now
be demonstrated, however, pooling is not necessarily an intermediate case between one- and
two-parent nuclear families whenever κt ∈ [1/2,1].
One can think of the pooling arrangement as a representative two-parent family looking after
nt/κt children, as opposed to either one or two parents looking after nt, as analyzed in
Section 2. The transmission factor under pooling is therefore written as z(0,κt). If there is
no premature adult mortality, pooling is never called into operation, so that z(0,1) = z(1).
If κt = 1/2, the question arises as to whether two parents can impart a higher potential to
each of 2nt children than one parent (of either sex) to nt; in keeping with Assumption 2, they
could hardly do worse.
Assumption 10. For any given nt, z(0,κt) is a non-decreasing, continuous and differentiable
function of κt; it also satisﬁes z(0,1/2) ≥ z(2)/2 and z(0,1) = z(1).
Analogously to (2), the formation of human capital under pooling is given by
λt+1 = 2z(0,κt)f(et)λt + 1. (20)
Turning to preferences, let the ‘couple’ display the same degree of altruism towards natural
and adopted children alike, which implies that all children will be treated in the same way.
23Analogously to (10), therefore,
EUt(0) = 2[u(ct) + nt(κ
e
t+1/κt) · v(2z(0,κt)f(et)λt + 1)]. (21)
Since κt < 1, a comparison of (21) and (10) reveals that there is a greater weight on the chil-
dren’s future human capital under pooling than under nuclear family arrangements (in which
the weights are identical for one- and two-parent families). The assumption that the adults
view all children in their care with equal altruism therefore tugs in the opposite direction to






capital and mortality in the present and the ratio of expected future to current mortality. Note
that eP
t (·,·,·) is increasing in the ﬁrst two of its arguments when eP
t ∈ (0,1) if both goods
are normal. Moreover, an increase of
κe
t+1
κt induces an increase in eP
t if 0 < eP
t < 1 and it
preserves eP
t = 1; for it increases the weight on v(λt+1) relative to that on u(ct). Note that
Assumption 7 applied to the pooling case implies that in the case of a stationary environment
with perfect foresight, i.e. κe
t+1 = κt+1 = κt = κ, ∀t and nt+1 = nt, ∀t, altruism is
not operative when the adults are uneducated, i.e., eP
t (2λt,κ,1) = 0 ∀ κ ∈ [κ,1] and
∀ 2λt ≤ 2 + ∆, ∆ > 0. This follows from
e
P
t (2λt,κ,1) ≤ e
P
t (2λt,1,1) = e
0
t(Λt(1),1,1).
In the case of a stationary environment with perfect foresight, the critical value of human





∗(0,κ) + 1. (22)
Were it not for the force of equal altruism towards all children under pooling, Assumption
10 and the argument that yields λt+1(1) ≥ λt+1(2) = λt+1(3) in Section 2.2 would yield the
following result: λ∗(1,κ) ≤ λ∗(0,κ) ≤ λ∗(2,κ) ∀κ ∈ [1/2,1]. An alternative assumption
about altruism towards adopted children will sufﬁce to ensure that it indeed holds.
24Lemma 3
Suppose, by social convention, that all children must be treated identically, but surviving




∗(2,κ) ∀κ ∈ [1/2,1].
5.2 The Virtues and Drawbacks of Pooling
Since pooling is a form of social insurance against premature mortality, it is interesting to
ask whether this form of organization is better able to withstand a shock to mortality than one
based on the nuclear family. To answer this question, we proceed as in Section 3.2. Since
all state-sequences involve pooling, we abuse notation somewhat by setting σt = 0 ∀t. We













λ1(0) + 1, (24)
and hence, by recursive substitution, the critical condition analogous to (17):
λ2(0,κ−1,κ0,κ1,λ0) ≥ λ
∗(0,κ−1). (25)
Observe that, in contrast to condition (17), κ0 now plays a role; for it affects the budget set
when the outbreak occurs in period 0. The following result is immediate.
Proposition 3
Given Assumptions 8 and 9, no collapse will occur under pooling if condition (25) holds;
otherwise, the entire group begins an immediate descent into the poverty trap.
The outcome in the ﬁrst part stands in contrast to that in part (ii) of Proposition 1. Under
pooling, moreover, perfect equality is maintained within each generation. The drawback
arises when the course of mortality during the epidemic is adverse that the ﬁnal level of
25human capital lies below the critical level in the ﬁnal (also status quo ante) disease envi-
ronment. Equality of treatment then pulls everyone down together, whereas in a nuclear
family structure, two-parent families will continue to experience growth if λ∗(1,κ−1) <
λ2((1,1),κ−1,κ1,λ0), whereitshouldberecalledfromLemma3thatλ∗(1,κ−1) ≤ λ∗(0,κ−1).
If λ∗(1,κ−1) < λ2((1,1),κ−1,κ1,λ0) indeed holds, there are very important consequences
when policy interventions are possible; for two-parent families comprise the main tax base
in a nuclear family setting.
If mortality does not revert to its status quo ante level, one can obtain deﬁnite qualitative
results if the ﬁrst maximum mortality attains after the outbreak is also the global one. As in
Proposition 3, the possible outcomes involve two simple polar cases.
Proposition 4
Suppose condition (7) and Assumption 9 hold, with κ0 < 1. Then, under pooling:
(i) if λ∗(0,κτ) > λτ for some τ < T and κt = κ ∀t > T, the economy will collapse;
(ii) if λT > λ∗(0,κ) and κt+1 ≥ κt ∀t > T, the economy will not collapse.
Proof: see appendix. The proposition states that the epidemic poses a threat to the economy
until mortality reaches its peak. If the economy can survive until period T, it will not then
experience a collapse as long as mortality also declines thereafter.11
Finally, we establish a general collapse result for the pooling case that holds for any epi-
demiological pattern. For this purpose, we introduce the assumption that parents will fully
educate their children if their human capital is sufﬁciently high.






) = 1 ∀κ ∈ [κ,1]. (26)
11Otherwise, a collapse after period T cannot be excluded, even if κt never falls below κ for t > T.
26Proposition 5
Suppose condition (7), Assumption 9 with κ0 < 1 and Assumptions 10 and 11 hold. Then
under pooling there exists a critical value λcrit





The proof is given in the appendix.
6 Awareness Campaigns
As established above, parents’ expectations regarding the mortality risks facing their chil-
dren in adulthood play an important role in inﬂuencing how the former react to the epidemic.
Arguably, individuals will only adjust their expectations regarding the ensuing wave of mor-
tality with a lag, so that Assumption 9 does not hold. While the disease is spreading, a slow
adjustment of expectations is beneﬁcial for long-run development, because families keep on
investing in human capital. This may introduce some ethically troubling tradeoffs when a
government or an international organization considers launching an awareness campaign. A
proper understanding of the causes of the disease and its modes of transmission may help to
reduce the current risk of infection, as individuals are induced to behave more cautiously, but
it may also bring about an immediate upward revision of expectations about future mortality,
since individuals also will become aware that the disease will not disappear soon.
To illustrate this potential tension, consider the following extreme case. Suppose κ−1 = 1
andletthediseasebreakoutinperiod0withtheepidemicpatternsummarizedby{g(κt,t)}∞
t=0.
Up to some period t0, individuals remain unaware of its long-term course and impact, and
consider the attendant mortality as a temporary negative shock, i.e. each generation of par-
ents forms the expectations κe
t+1 = 1 for all t < t0. Now suppose that the launch of an aware-
ness campaign at t = 0 can so reduce the incidence of the disease in subsequent periods that
the new epidemic pattern summarized by {ˆ g(ˆ κt,t)}∞
t=0 satisﬁes ˆ g(ˆ κt,t) > g(κt,t) ∀t. These
27efforts may also change expectations, however, as individuals become aware that their chil-
dren will face similar risks. Suppose further that the campaign is so succesful that it leads to
perfect foresight regarding the evolution of the epidemic. We obtain:
Proposition 6
The awareness campaign may trigger a collapse which otherwise would not occur.
Proof: see appendix. It should be emphasized that this proposition does not call awareness
campaigns into question in a fundamental way. It does imply, however, that such campaigns
– which can greatly reduce the number of deaths and those in dire need – should be comple-
mented by policies that promise credibly to reduce future mortality risks, in order to avoid
undesirable expectational feedbacks.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
The central conclusion of this paper is that the weakening of the mechanism through which
human capital is transmitted and accumulated across generations through epidemic diseases
becomes apparent only after a lag, and it is progressively cumulative in its effects. The pur-
pose of this paper is the development of a suitable framework to examine the macroeconomic
consequences of AIDS. The structure in this section can be directly used for policy analysis.
When policy measures such as prevention and education can change the mortality pattern,
the cost of such measures can be weighed against the beneﬁts predicted by the model (see
Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach, 2006, for an application to South Africa).
The current paper focusses on the feedbacks from premature mortality to education, the for-
mation of human capital and output. The framework offers some useful directions for future
research. Introducing physical capital would tend to weaken the link between the course of
the epidemic and economic growth, as the depreciation of physical capital is not affected by
the disease. In turn, the opportunity to accumulate physical capital diverts resources from
human capital formation and may tend to aggravate the decline of education when a society
28is assailed by an epidemic. Whether the presence of physical capital tends to retard or to
accelerate a collapse is an important avenue for further research. Moreover, there must be
a concern about negative supply-side effects in the education sector. An epidemic disease
such as AIDS may tend to reduce the supply of teachers in a higher proportion than children,
which may undermine the quality of education and so accelerate a collapse.
298 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
In order to establish the relationship between λ∗(s,κ) and e0(Λ∗(s),s,κ), we differentiate







λ∗ − (3 − s)z(s)f0(e0) ∂e0
∂λ∗ − 1
λ∗(3 − s)z (s)f (e0)
(27)
Since λ ∗ (s,κ) is the smallest value that exceeds unity and since Assumption 7 holds, the




















Hence, the denominator in (27) is negative. According to the properties of the function
e0
t(Λt(st),st,κe
t+1), the numerator in (27) is positive, which proves the ﬁrst claim. To estab-


















and again, the properties of e0
t(Λt(st),st,κe
t+1).
Suppose that in a particular period t we have λt(2,κ) = λ∗(1,κ). Then, the preceding
observation implies λt+1(2,κ) ≤ λ∗(1,k). The second claim then follows at once.
30Proof of Proposition 2:
To examine the household’s decisions, we form the Lagrangian for st = 1 and st = 2:
L(st) = (3 − st)ct + (3 − st)ntκt+1δ {ln(2z et λt + 1 + ζ)}
+µ{α((3 − st)λt + ntγ) − (3 − st + nt β)ct − nt αγ et}
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂L
∂ct
= (3 − st) −
¡
3 − st + ntβ
¢





(3 − st)ntκt+1δ 2z λt
2z et λt + 1 + ζ
− µαntγ ≤ 0, et ≥ 0 complementarily






2κt+1 δ z λt(3 − st + nt β) − αγ(1 + ζ)
2αγ z λt
, st = 1,2




2κt+1 δ z Λt(st)(3 − st + nt β) − αγ(1 + ζ)(3 − st)
2αγ z Λt(st)




t(Λt(2),2,κt+1) ∀λt and ∀κt+1 as long as an interior
solution holds for st = 2. Obviously, e0
t(Λt(st),st,κt+1) is set to zero if (28) yields a
negative number, and it is set to unity if (28) yields a number larger than 1. The budget




−2κt+1 δ z λtnt(3 − st + ntβ) + αγnt(1 + ζ) + 2αλt z
¡
(3 − st)λt + ntγ
¢
(3 − st + nt β)2z λt
,




−2κt+1 δ z Λt(st)nt(3 − st + ntβ) + αγnt(1 + ζ)(3 − st)




(3 − st + ntβ)2zΛt(st)
31Proof of Proposition 4:











Since κτ+1 < κτ for τ < T and since eP





τ (2λτ,κτ,1)λτ + 1 < λτ
since λτ is below λ∗(0,κt). Hence, a progressive decline sets in since λ∗(0,κt) ≤ λ∗(0,κt+1)
for t > τ.






)λT + 1 ≥ 2z(0,κ)f(e
P
T(2λT,κ,1))λT + 1 > λT
Hence, human capital will continue to grow after the peak of the disease. Repeating the
argument for the next periods establishes the assertion.
Proof of Proposition 5:





0 (2λ0,κ0,1) because κ1 < κ0 according to condition (7). Hence, eP
0 (2λ0,κ0,
κ1
κ0) = 0 if
2λ0 ≤ 2 + ∆ according to Assumption 7. Hence, λ1 = 1 and thus λt = 1 ∀t ≥ 1.
From Assumption 11 we know that if λ0 > λa(κ), then eP(λ0,κ0,
κ1
κ0) = 1 and human capital
will grow forever.
Furthermore, if 1 < λ1
0 < λ2
0, then we have λ1
t ≤ λ2
t ∀t ≥ 1 because of the properties
of the function eP
t (·,·,·). Therefore, if starting with λ0 causes a collapse, then starting with
˜ λ0 < λ0 also causes a collapse. On the other hand, if starting with λ0 leads to sustainable
growth, starting with ˜ λ0 > λ0 also leads to sustainable growth. Then, the result follows by
contradiction.
32Proof of Proposition 6:
We construct an example in the following way: we consider an epidemic pattern with ˆ κt = ˆ κ

















since ˆ κ1 > κ1 and 1
κ1 >
ˆ κ2
ˆ κ1 can hold simultaneously.12 Hence, human capital in t = 2 will
be higher when no awareness policies are introduced. If λ2 under the awareness policy is
smaller than λ∗(0, ˆ κ2) then the economy will collapse as shown in Proposition 4. With no
awareness policy, however, human capital may grow so much such that revised expectations
at a later stage do not induce a collapse.
12It is straightforward to give speciﬁc examples.
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